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Abstract 
In the past decade, the East-Central European countries were provided significant 
external capacity building assistance in order to help their emergence as donors of 
foreign aid. This paper aims to map these capacity development programs and identify 
where they have helped and what challenges remain for the new donors. The main 
conclusion is that while capacity building has been instrumental in building 
organizational structures, working procedures and training staff, deeper underlying 
problems such as low levels of financing, lacking political will, the need for visibility 
and low staff numbers continue to hinder the new international development policies. 
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The ten East-Central European (ECE) new member states of the European Union (EU) 
have (re-)emerged as donors of foreign aid in the past ten years. Mainly driven by their 
accession to the EU, they have all created the necessary organizational and legal 
structures, and have started financing bilateral and multilateral official development 
assistance (ODA) programs. These new international development policies however are 
still rather in their infancy in terms of both quantity and quality, and thus are difficult to 
compare with the policies of leading established donors like the United Kingdom or 
Sweden. The ten ECE countries face a number of challenges in development 
cooperation that include increasing their development spending, securing public 
support, increasing low administrative capacities and adapting to international norms 
and recommendations.  
In the past decade, several established donors like the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA),the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) or 
the Austrian Development Agency, as well as international organizations like the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Commission (EC) 
have provided assistance in the form of capacity building and knowledge sharing to 
these new donors, helping them in formulating their emerging international 
development policies. While there are numerous examples of donors learning from each 
other informally, there have been very few cases of explicit capacity building in other 
emerging donors, and the scale of the undertaking in the ECE countries is definitely 
unique and unprecedented. The aim of this paper is to map these capacity building 
programs, the problems they have addressed and the remaining challenges the ten new 
donors face. The main finding is that capacity building has played an important role in 
helping these countries become donors of foreign aid, by introducing them to modern 
organizational and procedural development practices, assisting them in increasing their 
resources and exposing them to the global development regime. However, deeper 
problems, such as the lack of political will to take development cooperation seriously, 
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the unwillingness to work together with other donors, or constant organizational and 
staff constraints remain, and are most likely much more difficult to solve. The paper 
only concentrates on official development policies, and due to limitations on space does 
not discuss the challenges other development stakeholders, such as non-governmental 
organizations face. 
The paper contributes to the small but growing literature on the ECE new donors by 
mapping capacity development programs provided to them, an issue often referred to in 
the literature but never fully explored (see Bucar and Mrak 2007; Lightfoot, 2008; 
2010; Andrespok and Kasekamp, 2012; Oprea 2012). The paper also has important 
policy implications, for two reasons. First, even after ten years of donorship, the ECE 
countries are still rather new donors and further capacity building is clearly needed in 
order to assist them in approximating their practices to OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) guidelines and other internationally agreed best practices, such as the 
Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda or the Busan Partnership. Second, providers of 
new donor capacity building assistance can use the lessons learned in the ECE countries 
to increase the effectiveness of similar programs in countries like  Croatia, Turkey and 
potentially Russia. For example, the UNDP’s ‘New Development Partnerships’ 
initiative is active in these three countries and may benefit from ECE experience on 
which capacity development approaches have worked.  
The following section provides an overview of the main characteristics of the emerging 
official development policies in the ECE countries. Section 3 presents research 
methodology, the main capacity building programs, and their effects in terms of aid 
quantity, allocation, and quality. Section 4 discusses the challenges ECE donors face 
today, which have not been solved by capacity building, and section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. The East-Central European Countries as (Re-)Emerging Donors  
Although the ECE donors are often called ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ donors of foreign aid, 
this is not completely precise. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Yugoslavia all had relatively extensive foreign assistance policies during the 
Communist regimes before 1989, under the name of ‘technical and scientific 
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cooperation’ (Baginski, 2002; Oprea, 2012). During the Cold War the countries of the 
Eastern Bloc did not have sovereign foreign policies, and thus their international 
development efforts were also subordinated to the political and military interests of the 
Soviet Union. These policies consisted mainly of the supply of various equipment, 
experts and know-how, scholarships and tied credits (Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, 2008). 
Main recipients included the so-called ‘developing socialist brother’ countries, like 
Mongolia, North-Korea, (North-)Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Cuba, as well as other 
developing countries which oriented themselves towards the Soviet-bloc at one time or 
another during the Cold War, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and South-Yemen. 
Aid programs at the time did not make a difference between development and military 
aid, and as such had significant military dimensions (HUN-IDA, 2004). 
After the transition process began in ECE, all countries ceased their international 
development activities and turned from being donors to recipients. International 
organizations like the World Bank and the EC, as well as countries like the United 
States, Germany, or the Netherlands appeared as donors to support the transition 
process and provide expertise in building institutions. During the 1990s, the 
development cooperation activities of the ECE countries were limited to smaller ad hoc 
contributions to multilateral agencies, humanitarian aid and a limited number of 
scholarships to students from developing countries.  
After the turn of the Millennium however, the eight ECE countries which joined the EU 
in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) began recreating their international development policies. The process began 
later in Romania and Bulgaria. The main reason to (re-)establish these policies was 
external pressure: creating a bilateral international development policy in-line with the 
spirit of EU’s relevant acquis communautaire was an explicit requirement during the 
accession negotiations (Drozd 2007). Beyond this, the EU voiced little further 
requirements (Carbone, 2004; Lightfoot, 2010). Development policy in the EU was (and 
still is) a ‘complementary’ policy area, with member states retaining full control of their 
bilateral policies and the EC being responsible for managing aid from the EU’s common 
resources and coordinating member states activities. Thus, there were very little legally 
binding rules on member state development policies (Horky, 2010), and actual 
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implementation was left to the accession countries. Many donors, most notably CIDA, 
the UNDP and also the EC stepped in to help the accession countries in this process. 
Donors had different motivations for providing capacity building. Both CIDA and the 
UNDP for example were highly active donors in the ECE countries during the transition 
process, but had begun phasing out their assistance in the early 2000s. CIDA was 
looking for a ‘graceful exit’ from the ECE countries, and providing capacity building 
for development policies seemed an ideal ‘final project’ for CIDA in the region.3 This is 
more or less true for the UNDP as well, although they were much slower in 
withdrawing from the region. The EC on the other hand sought to strengthen the new 
members in order to allow them more meaningful participation in the shaping of the 
EU’s common development policy.4  
By 2003, all of the eight accession countries had operational development policies and 
had begun implementing their first bilateral projects. Based on their similar historical, 
political, socio-economic characteristics, the ECE donors have a number of common 
characteristics and challenges in their international development policies. These 
challenges can be placed into three broad groups: increasing aid quantity, dilemmas 
concerning aid allocation, and issues related to the quality of ECE aid, broadly defined. 
The following section looks at how external capacity building programs have addressed 
these three areas. While there is clear evidence of the ECE countries becoming 
increasingly differentialized and heterogeneous in terms of their international 
development policies (see Horky-Hluchan and Lightfoot, 2012) their starting positions 
were highly similar, which warrants treating them as a single group for the purposes of 
this paper. 
 
3. The Role of External Capacity Building 
3.1. Research Methods 
Data were collected in two steps. The first step involved mapping the capacity 
development programs using a web search methodology, focusing on the websites of 
OECD DAC donors, major multilateral agencies and the ministries of foreign affairs 
                                                            
3 Interview with an official from CIDA, 19 April 2012. 
4 Interview with an official from the EC, 25 May 2012. 
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(MFAs) and/or aid implementing agencies of the ECE new donors. Using this approach, 
it was possible to identify all major capacity development projects that have taken place 
between 2001 and 2011. In the second step, individual contact persons at the respective 
agencies were contacted to provide further information, either by granting access to 
non-public documents (such as concept papers, planning documents, interior evaluation 
reports, or output documents of the programs) or by providing a possibility for an 
interview. Another source of information were officials from the foreign ministries of 
the ECE countries. In all, 21 experts at established donors, international organizations, 
ECE ministries and implementing agencies (mainly from the Czech Republic and 
Hungary) provided access to documents or were interviewed. The interviews were 
carried out between March and May 2012, and mainly focused on the description of 
capacity building activities, their outputs and outcomes, and the perceptions of the 
experts on the challenges the new donors continue to face. As the research mainly 
concentrated on mapping and not a formal evaluation, conclusions related to the impact 
of the capacity building programs should be seen as highly tentative. 
 
3.2. Mapping the Programs 
The two largest and most comprehensive capacity building programs were the ‘Official 
Development Assistance in Central Europe’ (ODACE) program, carried out by CIDA 
and the UNDP’s ‘Emerging Donors Initiative’. Both of these programs offered a wide 
range of capacity development activities, including traditional knowledge transfer 
through training, mentoring, workshops and on-site consultancy, as well as allowing the 
new ECE donors possibilities for learning by doing through joint programming (CIDA) 
and the UNDP Trust Funds, both discussed later. ECE countries were able to select the 
approaches that best suited their needs in both programs, thus the way they were 
actually implemented varied from one country to another. 
The EC was also an important provider of knowledge, with several capacity schemes 
during the 2000s and starting with more formal training activities and moving to the 
promotion of joint actions with the new donors more recently. The EC program is the 
only capacity building program for the new members which is still ongoing in all 
countries, and the UNDP only remains active in Romania and current accession 
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countries like Croatia and Turkey. CIDA, the UNDP and the EC targeted more or less 
all of the ECE new members. Other capacity development programs either targeted a 
smaller group of countries, or only focussed on a specific set of activities. The Austrian 
Development Agency’s Regional Partnership Program for example only included a 
small joint programming element, where ECE and Austrian NGOs were required to 
work together in project implementation.  The North-South Centre (an autonomous 
agency of the Council of Europe) on the other hand focused on a single specialized 
issue, in-line with its mandate of promoting public awareness of global development 
issues: formalizing development education in the ECE countries. The capacity building 
programs identified are detailed in Table 1. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
3.3. Aid Quantity 
Most of the capacity building programs had a clear component which aimed at 
increasing ODA expenditures of the ECE countries. Table 2 provides details on the 
evolution of ODA expenditures, both in absolute terms and as percentage of the 
countries’ gross national incomes (GNI), between 2002 and 2011. There is a clear run-
up of ODA spending between 2002 and 2006 in most new donors. Based on the 
interviews, it is argued that a part of this increase can be reasonably attributed to the 
capacity building programs, for three reasons. First, an important component in the 
early stages of these programs was to help the new donors to establish ODA delivery 
mechanisms, tendering and contracting procedures, project cycle management practices, 
etc.5 As there was little experience in the ECE countries on these issues, advice on how 
to formalize these procedures greatly speeded things up, and allowed most ECE 
countries to start their bilateral ODA policies in 2003 (and even earlier in the case of the 
Czech Republic).6  
 
                                                            
5 Interview with an official from CIDA, 19 April 2012. 
6 Interview with an official from an ECE ministry of foreign affairs, 4 April 2012.  
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<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
Second, the major capacity development programs have all attempted to increase ECE 
bilateral ODA directly as well, either by providing a framework for the national 
governments’ bilateral expenditures and getting a commitment from the governments 
on a certain amount of national resources, or by contributing to bilateral development 
projects on a cost sharing basis. The UNDP for example has supported the creation of 
Trust Funds with the new donors as an interim institutional solution while these donors 
gain sufficient experience in their bilateral development policy. The UNDP set up Trust 
Funds with four new donors: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 
These funds were mainly financed by the respective governments, but the UNDP 
provided overall guidance and a set of procedural rules on how to use these resources. 
The UNDP managed to secure government contributions of approximately 22 million 
dollars between 2004 and 2011 for the funds.7 Another good example was CIDA’s 
approach, which relied on providing co-financing to certain development projects, 
implemented in the partner countries by ECE NGOs. CIDA took part in setting the rules 
for the call for tenders and also co-evaluated the proposals. In total, CIDA contributed 
to 124 ECE development projects in third countries between 2005 and 2008.8 ADA 
financed a similar cost-sharing exercise, but in their case there was an explicit 
requirement for ECE NGOs to partner with Austrian ones.9 
Third, as one interviewee mentioned, the CEE donors at the time knew little about how 
to report their ODA statistics according to DAC standards.10 Almost all capacity 
development programs included providing training on reporting ODA statistics, and due 
to these trainings ECE ministry officials were able to ‘find’ several government 
expenditures which could be classified as ODA.  
While the capacity building programs therefore had a clear impact on ODA quantitative 
outcomes, it is also clear that other large parts of the increase had nothing to do with the 
programs, but reflect the fact that after joining the EU in 2004 (or 2007 for Romania 
                                                            
7 Interview with an expert from the UNDP, 11 April 2012. 
8 Internal documents provided by an official from CIDA, 19 April 2012. 
9 Interview with an official from an ECE aid agency, 10 April 2012. 
10 Interview with an official from an ECE MFA, 4 April 2012. 
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and Bulgaria), the ECE countries began contributing to the community budget, and a 
portion of these contributions qualifies as ODA.  
It is also clear that significant challenges remain in increasing ODA further. As shown 
in Table 2, the rapid growth in ODA/GNI ratios stopped after 2006, and the past years 
have been characterized with stagnation, decline and only moderate growth. No ECE 
country was able to fulfil the 0.17 ODA/GNI target set in the framework of the EU for 
2010 (European Commission 2005). None of them have set clear timetables to reach the 
target for 2015, 0.33% percent. With the eruption of the global economic crisis in 2008, 
severe strains were placed on the government budgets of the new members. 
Development cooperation is a low priority policy area for ECE governments, 
expenditures on it have little impact on voters, thus budget cuts were especially 
pronounced here. A further issue is that within ODA, the bulk is made up of multilateral 
contributions, accounting for more than 75% of ODA in most ECE countries.  
 
3.4. Aid Allocation 
The most important partner countries of the ECE donors are selected either from the 
neighbourhood (i.e. the Western Balkans and the former Soviet countries) or from 
among the countries with which the ECE countries have had previous (pre-1989) 
development relations. Iraq and Afghanistan also figure prominently among the most 
important recipients due to the close alliance of the ECE countries with the United 
States. Most ECE countries have little activities in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kopinsky 2012) 
and Latin-America. Aid allocation thus seems to be heavily driven by foreign policy 
considerations (Andrespok and Kasekamp 2012; Szent-Iványi 2012a). 
The capacity development programs have done little to address aid allocation issues, 
and seem to have taken for granted that the ECE countries concentrate most of their aid 
in their neighbourhood and not on the poorest countries. Looking at the allocation of aid 
under the joint programming initiative of CIDA, most of the projects were concentrated 
in the neighbourhood: in case of Hungary 70% of the projects were carried out in the 
Ukraine and Serbia.11 Recently, the EC began an initiative to engage the new members 
                                                            
11 Internal documents provided by an official from CIDA, 19 April 2012. 
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in joint actions, and it chose Moldova as the pilot country.12 A notable exception 
however was the UNDP-Slovak Trust Fund: between 2004 and 2008, more than a 
quarter of the Trust Fund’s total resources were spent in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 
and SlovakAid 2008: 80), mostly on small scale projects implemented by Slovak 
NGOs. 
Clearly, severe challenges remain in diversifying ECE aid allocation. The EU requires 
its members to spend at least 15% of their ODA on least developed countries and also to 
progressively increase their funding to Africa. On the other hand, the EU also promotes 
division of labour among donors and urges its members to specialize. The ECE 
countries argue that they have comparative advantages in their neighbourhood and the 
costs of being present in regions like Africa are difficult to justify with low bilateral aid 
levels (Szent-Iványi 2012b). Also, concentrating most of their aid in the neighbourhood 
seems to be in-line with foreign policy considerations like the need for regional 
stability, and the promotion of business interests or supporting their ethnic minorities. 
 
3.5. Aid Quality 
Capacity building programs have attempted to assist the ECE countries in a wide range 
of issues related to aid quality, such as training on programming methods, advice on 
institutional set-ups for efficient aid delivery, evaluation, and transparency. Attempts to 
involve the ECE countries in joint programming activities can also be seen as a way to 
increase aid quality, in-line with internationally agreed good practices as embodied in 
the Paris Declaration. From this wide range of qualitative issues, two are discussed here: 
institutional structures and programming methods. 
The governmental institutional structures set up during the capacity development 
programs are in many cases still working to this day, or new institutional structures have 
evolved based on them. CIDA’s ODACE program was heavily explicit that all CEE 
countries must prepare an institutional development plan (with CIDA assistance), which 
would form the backbone for planning and delivering CIDA technical assistance. CIDA 
experts also drafted detailed staffing plans, operational manuals and other documents 
for the institutions involved in ODA to use (see for example Norcott 2003). A clear 
                                                            
12 Interview with an official from the EC, 25 May 2012. 
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success story is the UNDP’s involvement in the creation of the Slovak Agency for 
International Development Cooperation (SlovakAid). The predecessor of the agency 
was the Administrative and Contracting Unit (ACU), a ‘joint venture’ of the Slovak 
MFA and the UNDP, created to manage the administrative side of the UNDP-Slovakia 
Trust Fund. The unit was gradually strengthened and in 2009 it transformed into a fully-
fledged implementation agency (UNDP and SlovakAid 2008). The UNDP also played 
an important role in supporting capacities at the Czech Development Centre 
(transforming into the Czech Development Agency in 2008) and the Hungarian 
International Development Agency (HUN-IDA), although the later has lost its 
implementing agency status since then.13 Many other CEE countries, especially the 
three Baltic countries, Poland and Slovenia, decided to opt-out of the UNDP Trust Fund 
scheme, and Romania chose a solution which does not really build national capacities.14  
Closely related to institutional structures is the second issue, the methods, rules and 
procedures used to plan, program and deliver ODA (such as project cycle management, 
programming, tendering and contracting, etc.) and also a more general understanding of 
development issues. Providing training in these methods was an integral part of most 
programs, but the CEE donors were also assisted with hands-on consultancy services to 
define the working procedures of ODA. This was not an easy task as the new 
procedures needed to be in-line with the regulations of each country. Interviewees 
mentioned that assistance in formulating these procedures was invaluable, as MFA staff 
had no experience in these issues.15 A good approach was what the Finnish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs used in its ‘Twinning Light’ program in Hungary. Each of the eight 
training sessions of the program were followed by a session of hands-on mentoring, in 
which a Finnish expert helped the Hungarian staff members to actually implement the 
knowledge in their daily work.16 
                                                            
13 Clearly, the single implementing agency model was seen by the UNDP and CIDA as something that all 
CEE countries should strive for. However, convergence to this model proved difficult as it involved 
centralizing implementation and related funds from line-ministries to a single agency, and was thus 
resisted by the line-ministries. The reform was only fully successful in the Czech Republic. Line-
ministries retain important implementation responsibilities in all other ECE countries, even in countries 
where a formal implementing agency does exist. 
14 Interview with an official from UNDP, 6 April 2012. Romania decided to contribute to UNDP-run 
projects in countries like Georgia or Moldova, instead of launching its own development projects with 
UNDP assistance like the other countries. 
15 Interview with an official from an ECE ministry of foreign affairs, 4 April 2012. 




4. Remaining Challenges 
The research has revealed a number of areas which development experts at established 
donors, ECE countries and international organizations see as particularly pressing. 
When asked to talk about challenges that still need to be addressed, most interviewees 
mentioned strikingly similar issues, and these resonate well with some of the issues 
identified by the OECD DAC in its special reviews of the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. Five of these issues are discussed below. 
First, increasing aid quantity does not only depend on international commitments and 
the availability of budgetary resources, but also on the willingness of governments. 
Government attitudes towards ODA are still problematic (see also OECD 2011a: 15). 
Many capacity development programs attempted to involve politicians, CIDA for 
example organized a study tour for them to Canada to see how politicians there are 
involved in development cooperation. There were a handful of conferences and 
workshops to which politicians were also invited. In most ECE countries (Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania in particular), development 
cooperation is still very far from being embedded in daily politics and thus has little 
political support and low visibility. One expert interviewed emphasized that any future 
capacity development project is likely to have little impact unless the apathy and lack of 
willingness to go forward that seems to be prevalent towards ODA in many (though not 
all) of the ECE governments is addressed.17 All this is well illustrated by the following 
quote from a senior ECE diplomat: “Don’t have any illusions. If the EU didn’t require 
us to do development policy, we wouldn’t be doing it. The returns are just too small.”18 
This is not an obstacle that could be overcome quickly, and improving development 
education can play a role by making people aware of development issues, who in turn 
could then put greater pressure on politicians.  
A second issue revolves around the fact that the ECE countries wish to preserve their 
visibility as donors and seem unwilling to compromise on strategic goals.19 This is 
shown well by the mixed results of later capacity development programs which focused 
                                                            
17 Interview with a development expert at an international organization, 25 March 2012. 
18 Interview with an official from an ECE ministry of foreign affairs, 5 May 2012. 
19 Interview with an official at a Western development agency, 15 April 2012. 
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on joint programming. Both USAID and Sida initiated programs in the region with the 
aim of using the regional experience of the new donors in projects in the post-Soviet 
region and the Balkans. According to an expert interviewed, Sida’s Partnership Program 
attracted only limited interest from the ECE countries, which can be traced back to the 
fact that Sida’s approach was difficult to reconcile with the preferences of the ECE 
countries.20 Whereas Sida supported an approach based on the needs of the partner 
countries, this thinking proved to be new for the ECE partners. The new EU member 
states were working mainly through financing national NGOs which then implemented 
their own project ideas in the recipient countries. Line-ministries and their own partners 
seemed to work rather independently from the MFAs. Creating true joint projects would 
involve harmonizing procedures and also strategic goals, but the ECE countries did not 
seem ready to compromise on these. Issues on visibility are also mentioned in some of 
the special reviews (OECD 2011a: 16; 2011b: 9). 
Third, strategic thinking and planning is still not sufficiently present. Drafting ODA 
strategies, as well as country assistance strategies was an important component both in 
CIDA’s and the UNDP’s programs, but these efforts did not prove sustainable. Strategic 
thinking seems to be present in only a limited number of ECE countries, mainly the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia (OECD 2011b: 12). Several interviewees 
mentioned that they feel that ECE ODA policies are rather ad hoc, without any clear 
strategic direction.21 Many of the ECE countries do not have operational country 
assistance strategies, which makes much of their assistance donor-driven and ad hoc. 
Hungary for example has never had an operational ODA strategy, and the first country 
strategies drafted in the late 2000s were never operationalized either. A symptom of the 
lack of strategic thinking is the excessively large number of partner countries that 
almost all ECE donors have.22 
The fourth issue is evaluation and learning from results. Most experts interviewed 
mentioned impact evaluation as an issue where further capacity development is needed. 
ECE countries neglect evaluation almost totally, and at best only carry out financial 
monitoring of their development activities (the Czech Republic and to some extent 
                                                            
20 Interview with an official from Sida, 19 April 2012. 
21 Interview with an expert from an international organization, 11 April 2012. 
22 In 2010 for example, Hungary divided its bilateral aid budget of a mere 22 million dollars among more, 
than 70 partner countries (OECD 2012). 
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Slovakia are perhaps exceptions). This lack of attention to evaluation is not only a 
question of resources, but one of mentality.23 In most ECE countries there is little 
culture of evaluation in the government sector, and governments seem to perceive 
evaluation as source of criticism on their activities, not a possibility for learning and 
improving policies. The problem therefore is one which cannot be solved with capacity 
building, but it requires attempts to form government attitudes on the topic and fostering 
a culture of evaluation (OECD, 2010: 10; 2011a: 31; 2011b: 30). 
Fifth, staff capacity problems remain due to two reasons: development staff numbers in 
ECE MFAs are low and turnover among them is high (see also: OECD, 2007: 17-18; 
2010: 10; 2011a: 25; 2011b: 26). Development departments and implementing agencies 
are often understaffed, for example, in early 2012, there were only 8 experts working on 
development cooperation in the Hungarian MFA and 4 in Bulgaria. Staff members 
taking part in trainings, study visits, internships etc. during the capacity building 
programs were often rotated away afterwards to different jobs or foreign missions. 
Many staff members actively sought new assignments, as the prestige of development 
cooperation was rather low in some MFAs. Clearly, frequent changes in development 
staff means that much of the knowledge transferred may be lost, leading to severe 
effectiveness and sustainability problems in the capacity building programs.24 It is not 
clear how future capacity building programs could address this issue. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presented the results of a mapping exercise of capacity building programs 
offered to the ECE new donors between 2001 and 2011. Despite the fact that these 
donors have received important external assistance in formulating their international 
development policies, substantial challenges remain. Capacity building programs have 
contributed to increasing ODA, the creation of basic institutional structures and 
operating procedures, as well as training staff in how to do development cooperation, 
but issues like low aid quantity, the lack of political willingness, the need to preserve 
                                                            
23 Interview with an expert from an international organization, 11 April 2012. 
24 A strikingly negative and most likely not unique example was when the Foreign Ministry of Finland 
provided an internship opportunity for a development staff member from the Hungarian MFA at the 
Finnish embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Shortly after her return to Budapest, the former intern was moved to 
the consular department and appointed to the Hungarian consulate in Helsinki. 
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visibility, problems with strategic thinking and low staff numbers still plague ECE 
bilateral development policies. 
One cannot help to think that the capacity building programs provided to the ECE 
donors mainly only helped in introducing formal institutions and procedures, but did not 
change underlying mentalities. The capacity building programs clearly had an important 
role in exposing ECE officials to the global development regime: development staff 
have learned to ‘talk the talk’ of international development cooperation, but decision 
makers may not be convinced of the need to take development cooperation seriously. 
Ten years ago, when ODA was a new issue, and there was clear external pressure to do 
something in the policy area due to the EU accession process, governments were more 
likely to heed external advice then they are today, when almost all such pressure has 
disappeared. National willingness is the only factor that can serve as a driving force 
today, and in the case of most ECE countries it is missing. This lack of willingness may 
signify that the ECE countries are ‘premature’ donors: they became donors of foreign 
aid before they were actually ready for it. 
Last, but not least, what have the providers of capacity building assistance learned? The 
fact that neither of these donors has carried out any formal impact evaluation of their 
project is telling: they have most likely seen these projects as one-off and highly 
specific. However, as some new donor capacity building programs are still active and 
such programs may be useful in building linkages with some of the non-DAC donors 
like Brazil, India or Russia, donors should be encouraged to learn from their experience 
in the ECE region. This paper has revealed that some capacity building approaches have 
worked better than others, but these conclusions need to be refined with more formal 
impact evaluations. 
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Table 1. Major capacity building programs for the new ECE donors 






Official Development Assistance in 
Central Europe (ODACE) 




Regional Partnership Program (RPR) 2005-2007 Cz, Hu, Sk, Si 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID) 
Emerging Donors Initiative (EDI) 2006-2009 Bu, Cr, Cz, Hu, Pl, Ro, 
Sk, Si 
Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
no systematic program 2006-2008 Pl 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands 
Strengthening the Implementing 
Capacity for ODA 
2006-2007 Hu 
Foreign Ministry of Finland Twinning Light 2007 Hu 
Swedish International 
Development Agency (Sida) 
Partnership Program 2009- Offered to all, with Es, 
Pl, Ro, Sk, Si being 
more involved 
United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) 
Emerging Donors Initiative 2003- Cr, Cz, Es, Hu, Li, Lt, 
Pl, Ro, Sk, Si, Tk 
European Commission (EC) Emerging Donors Capacity Building 
Schemes I-IV 
2004- Bu, Cz, Es, Hu, Li, Lt, 
Pl, Ro, Sk, Si  
Council of Europe North-
South Centre (CoE-NSC) 
Strengthening Global Education in 




Cz, Hu, Pl, Sk in the 
first phase, later all 
others 
* Country abbreviations are the following: Bu – Bulgaria, Cr – Croatia, Cz – Czech Republic, Es – 






Table 2. Net ODA disbursements in million dollars and as a percentage of gross 
national income in the ECE new donors, 2002-2011 
 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 2011 
Czech 
Republic  
86 147 154 180 201 194 227 210 228 .. 
0.07  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.13 0.13 
Estonia  
3 2 7 13 17 16 20 18 19 22 
.. .. 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Hungary  
.. 30 86 118 179 103 96 117 114 133 
.. 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 
Latvia  
2 1 10 12 13 16 21 21 16 18 
.. 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Lithuania  
2 2 11 18 28 49 47 37 37 48 
.. 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 
Poland  
24 43 167 252 345 361 317 392 378 399 
.. 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Romania  
.. .. .. .. .. .. 120 154 114 153 
.. .. .. .. .. 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 
Slovakia  
16 28 43 82 74 75 87 72 74 80 
0.02 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Slovenia  
.. .. .. 42 51 56 63 67 59 60 
.. .. .. 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 
OECD DAC 
average  
0.23 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 
Source: OECD (2013). Absolute figures are in constant 2010 dollars. 
Note: Bulgaria does not report ODA figures to the OECD DAC. 
 
